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Thermodynamic depth is an appealing but flawed structural complexity measure. It depends on a set of
macroscopic states for a system, but neither its original introduction by Lloyd and Pagels nor any follow-up
work has considered how to select these states. Depth, therefore, is at root arbitrary. Computational mechanics,
an alternative approach to structural complexity, provides a definition for a system’s minimal, necessary causal
states and a procedure for finding them. We show that the rate of increase in thermodynamic depth, or dive, is
the system’s reverse-time Shannon entropy rate, and so depth only measures degrees of macroscopic random-
ness, not structure. To fix this, we redefine the depth in terms of the causal state representation—e-machines—
and show that this representation gives the minimum dive consistent with accurate prediction. Thus,
e-machines are optimally shallow. @S1063-651X~99!12401-2#
PACS number~s!: 05.20.2y, 05.45.2a, 05.70.CeI. NATURAL COMPLEXITY
Dissipative dynamics, symmetry breaking, phase transi-
tions, bifurcations, and pattern formation, acting over differ-
ent temporal and spatial scales, at different levels and on
different substrates, are presumably responsible for assem-
bling and freezing in the wide diversity of structures ob-
served in the natural world. Each of these processes has its
more-or-less well-developed foundations. But where are the
principles that define and describe their products? What is
structure itself? Does each and every particular combination
of forces lead to a different and unique class of natural struc-
ture, requiring its own vocabulary and theory? And, how do
we detect that some new structure has emerged in the first
place?
These and related questions about nature’s complexity
have engaged a large number of researchers for several de-
cades now; for a sampling see, e.g., Refs. @1–5# and refer-
ences therein. One focus has been on quantitative measures
of the complexity of natural objects and of the processes that
bring them into existence—measures that capture properties
more interesting than mere randomness and disorder. Exist-
ing theory, such as is found in statistical mechanics, provides
relatively well-understood measures of disorder in ~say! tem-
perature and thermodynamic entropy, and of the flow of en-
ergy that can do work in the various free energies. While
many applications and problems remain, there is little press-
ing need for new conceptual approaches to randomness and
energy transduction. However, when it comes to structure
something is missing—something else must be invented and
then added to physical theory to account for, work with, and
quantify different kinds of structure.
*Electronic address: chaos@santafe.edu
†Electronic address: shalizi@santafe.eduPRE 591063-651X/99/59~1!/275~9!/$15.00One class of approaches to natural complexity is based on
the theory of sequential discrete computation @6,7#—the
theory of how sundry sorts of discrete-state devices process
information at varying levels of sophistication. The resulting
measures of complexity ultimately express structural proper-
ties in terms of universal Turing machines. Unfortunately,
almost all interesting mathematical and quantitative ques-
tions about these measures of structure inherit the uncomput-
ability associated with those all-powerful machines. More
fundamentally, though, the idea that everything in the world
is really a discrete-state computer strikes one as inadequate;
at a minimum nature is parallel, continuous, spatially ex-
tended, noisy, and quantum mechanical.
Fortunately, in the thermodynamic depth of Lloyd and
Pagels @8# we have a proposal for a noncomputation-
theoretic, empirically calculable measure of the complexity
of processes. One central motivation for defining the thermo-
dynamic depth is that it is small both for regular and for
random processes. Thus, one of its appealing features is that
depth measures something other than randomness—a prop-
erty already well-captured by both Kolmogorov-Chaitin
complexity @9–11# and Shannon entropy rate @12–15#.
In this paper we introduce the required background for
thermodynamic depth @8# and for an alternative approach to
natural complexity, called computational mechanics @16,17#,
that extends statistical mechanics to address issues of struc-
ture in a direct way. We review the definition of thermody-
namic depth and apply it to several simple Markov pro-
cesses, revealing several ambiguities. To remove them we
redefine the depth in terms of a representation based on
causal states, those states through which computational me-
chanics views the minimal structure of a system @16,17#. We
then prove our main results on the predictive optimality and
minimality of the causal state representation. Finally, we
draw a number of conclusions about using thermodynamic275 ©1999 The American Physical Society
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cesses.
II. PROCESSES
Following Lloyd and Pagels, we focus on discrete-time
processes and consider a given process as a joint probability
distribution Pr( . . . ,X21 ,X0 ,X1 , . . . ) over random ~‘‘mi-
croscopic’’! variables Xt at each time t that take values xt in
a continuous state space X. In accord with experimental con-
straints, we assume that the process is not observed directly,
but states are in fact measured via a finite-precision instru-
ment. The result is that our description of the process
is in all practicality a joint distribution over a chain
SJ[S22S21S0S1 of discrete-valued random variables
St that range over a finite set A of observed states. ~Although
our notation differs, this setup follows the account in Ref.
@8#, p. 194, of ‘‘macroscopic,’’ ‘‘measured,’’ or ‘‘coarse-
grained’’ states as partitions of the underlying microscopic
state space.!
We divide the chain into two semi-infinite halves by
choosing a time t as the dividing point. Denote the past by
SQ t[St23St22St21 ~1!
and the future by
SW t[StSt11St12St13 . ~2!
We will assume that the observed process is described by a
temporal shift-invariant measure m on bi-infinite realizations
s22s21s0s1s2 . . . ,siPA. The measure m induces a fam-
ily of distributions. Let Pr(st) denote the probability that at
time t the random variable St takes on the particular value
stPA and Pr(st11 , ,st1L) the joint probability over se-
quences of L consecutive measurements. Consistent with
Ref. @8#, we assume time-translation symmetry @18# and so
Pr(st11 , . . . ,st1L)5Pr(s1 , . . . ,sL). We denote a sequence
of L consecutive measurements by SL[S1 . . . SL ; when
looking to the future ~past! the sequence is denoted SW L (SQ L).
@In dropping the time index from Eqs. ~1! and ~2! we implic-
itly take t50.# We shall follow the convention that a capital
letter refers to a random variable, while a lowercase letter
denotes a particular value of that variable. Hence, sL will
denote a particular measurement sequence of length L.
III. ENTROPY AND RANDOMNESS
The average uncertainty of an L sequence SL is given by
the Shannon entropy of the joint distribution Pr(SL) @14#:
H@SL#[2 (
sLPA L
Pr~sL!log2Pr~sL!. ~3!
Looking forward in time, the rate of increase of this uncer-
tainty is defined by the entropy rate
hW m[ lim
L!`
H@SW L#
L , ~4!where m denotes the above-mentioned measure. The quantity
hW m measures the irreducible randomness in the generation of
future behavior: the randomness that remains after the corre-
lations over longer and longer futures are taken into account.
The reverse-time entropy rate hQ m is defined similarly in
terms of SQ L and measures historical randomness. Both can be
expressed in terms of a conditional entropy: given knowl-
edge of the measurement history, the uncertainty in the next
measurement S0 is
hW m5H@S0uSQ #; ~5!
and similarly, given the future, we have
hQ m5H@S21uSW # , ~6!
where the entropy of a random variable X conditioned on the
value of another random variable Y is defined as H@XuY #
[H@X ,Y #2H@Y # .
IV. THERMODYNAMIC DEPTH
Lloyd and Pagels propose that the complexity of a mac-
roscopic state sPA is determined by the history that led to s.
The motivation for this is that ‘‘complexity must be a func-
tion of the process—the assembly routine—that brought the
object into existence’’ ~emphasis theirs! ~@8#, p. 187!; in par-
ticular, it is a ‘‘measure of how hard it is to put something
together’’ ~@8#, p. 189!. Starting from a distribution over
macroscopic state sequences, one first finds the probability of
length-L histories that end in state s:
Pr~S2L11 , . . . ,S21 ,S05sus ! ~7!
[
Pr~S2L11 , . . . ,S21 ,S05s !
Pr~s ! . ~8!
Then the thermodynamic L-depth DL(s) of state s is defined
by the conditional entropy
DL~s ![H@S2L11 , . . . ,S21 ,S05sus# . ~9!
~From here on we ignore the distinction in Ref. @8# between
‘‘depth’’ and ‘‘thermodynamic depth’’ by, in effect, setting
Boltzmann’s constant to 1/ln 2.) Averaging over all such
states gives one the L-depth DL of the system as a whole:
DL[ (
sPA
Pr~s !DL~s !, ~10!
or
DL5H@S2L11 , . . . ,S21uS0# , ~11!
where we have used the identity H@X ,Y uX#5H@Y uX# . We
define D050.
The backstage intuition motivating thermodynamic depth
is the following: if there is little uncertainty about how to
attain a macroscopic state and if trajectories are confined
within narrow bounds, then the macroscopic state is easy to
assemble. In this case the process leading to that state and
generating those trajectories is simple and the state is shal-
PRE 59 277THERMODYNAMIC DEPTH OF CAUSAL STATESlow. If the historical uncertainty is large and if a wide range
of historical alternatives has been excluded, then the process
is complex and the macroscopic state is deep. ‘‘The thermo-
dynamic depth of a state b is proportional to the amount of
information ~in bits! needed to identify the trajectory that
leads to b given the information that the system is in b’’ ~@8#,
p. 196!.
Like all statistical complexity measures, thermodynamic
depth has forsworn awarding high complexities to mere ran-
domness. Reference @8# states that it vanishes for completely
random processes, as well as for totally ordered ones ~@8#,
pp. 187, 190, and 191!. For systems satisfying the microca-
nonical assumption of statistical mechanics, Lloyd and Pa-
gels ~@8# pp. 190, 194, and 195! provide another expression
for the depth, as the difference between a coarse-grained and
a fine-grained thermodynamic entropy. Using this alternate
expression, they argue that black holes ~@8#, p. 191!, gases at
thermal equilibrium ~@8#, p. 191!, and salt crystals ~@8#, p.
191! are shallow and the self-assembly of protein complexes
~@8#, p. 196! is deep. While it is sometimes easier to evaluate
the alternate expression than Eq. ~11!, it is strictly equivalent
to the latter in the cases where the necessary ~restrictive!
conditions behind the former hold, so we shall confine our-
selves to Eq. ~11! in what follows.
The total depth, limL!`DL , of a process might as well be
bottomless. Like L-depth, it depends on a baseline. That is, it
depends on the time when we judge the process to have
started and on the depth accumulated from the beginning of
time until then. At best, these choices can be a bit tricky to
figure out. Of greater physical significance, therefore, is the
asymptotic rate v at which the depth increases, which we call
dive:
v[ lim
L!`
@DL2DL21# . ~12!
The benefit of looking at a rate which is not considered in
Ref. @8# is that v is independent of the origin of time and so
allows one to more fairly compare processes by their rate of
depth generation.
We now show that v is the reverse-time entropy rate.
Recalling the definition of conditional entropy, H@Y uX#
5H@X ,Y #2H@X# , Eq. ~12! becomes
v5 lim
L!`
$H@S2L11 , . . . ,S0#2H@S0#
2H@S2L12 , . . . ,S0#1H@S0#% ~13!
5 lim
L!`
$H@S2L11 , . . . ,S0#
2H@S2L12 , . . . ,S0#% ~14!
5 lim
L!`
H@S2L11uS2L12 , . . . ,S0# ~15!
5H@S2L11uSW 2L12#5H@S21uSW # ~16!
5hQ m , ~17!
where the next-to-last step follows from time-translation in-
variance.For later use note that, since H@Y #>H@Y uX# , it follows
from Eq. ~16! and from translation invariance that
v<H@S0# . ~18!
For stationary or asymptotically stationary processes, we
have H@S2L12 , . . . ,S0#5H@S2L11 , . . . ,S21# . Thus, start-
ing from Eq. ~14! we also conclude that
lim
L!`
$H@S2L11 , . . . ,S0#2H@S2L11 , . . . ,S21#% ~19!
5 lim
L!`
H@S0uS2L11 , . . . ,S21# ~20!
5H@S0uSQ # ~21!
5hW m . ~22!
From this we see that ~i! the forward-time and reverse-time
entropy rates are equal, hQ m5hW m , and ~ii! they are the same
as the dive: v5hm . ~From here on we drop the time arrows
and denote a process’s entropy rate by hm .)
To summarize, we have shown that the Shannon entropy
rate controls the average rate of increase in the thermody-
namic depth and that the dive is invariant under time rever-
sal. Recall that hm also controls the average rate of increase
of Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity @14#. These aspects of
depth are not a surprise and are in accord with the claim that
‘‘the average complexity of a state must be proportional to
the Shannon entropy of the set of trajectories that experiment
determines can lead to that state’’ ~@8#, p. 190!. From these
elementary uses of information-theoretic identities, it is clear
at this point that thermodynamic depth measures nothing
other than the macroscopic randomness generated by a sys-
tem.
V. SOMETHING ROTTEN IN THE STATES
The analysis of the preceding section leaves us with a
puzzle: How is it that Lloyd and Pagels can state—e.g., on
each of the first six pages of Ref. @8#—that depth discounts
for disorder and so captures something other than random-
ness?
The problem, we claim, lies in their choice of states. In
the illustrative examples in Ref. @8# macroscopic states are
selected that support the desired properties of depth. That is,
the results and interpretations do not follow from a direct
application of the given definition of thermodynamic depth
alone; biases external to the definition are invoked.
Moreover, employing an appropriate set of macroscopic
states is crucial for obtaining a well-defined depth, since by
judiciously redefining them one can give the depth any value
from 0 on up. To see this, remember that the depth is the
conditional entropy of a sequence of states. If there is only
one state, the depth vanishes. If we make spurious macro-
scopic distinctions—e.g., acting as though one state was re-
ally n degenerate, equiprobable states—we add a contribu-
tion to the dive that is proportional to logn. And, we can
keep doing this until the depth is as large as we like ~cf.
discussion in Ref. @8# leading up to the example on page
191!.
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observed process are, at least, unambiguous candidates for
use in the calculation of depth, but have an unfortunate habit
of being unknown, redundant, or excessively fine grained.
Lloyd and Pagels considered this problem by implication,
discussing why, in some particular cases, certain choices of
state are better than others. They explain, for instance, on
page 191 of Ref. @8# how an unfortunate choice of measure-
ments can make even systems in thermodynamic equilibrium
quite deep. But they neither presented a procedure for pick-
ing sets of states nor gave general criteria for ranking pos-
sible alternative selections. This lack has not been remedied
by follow-up work on thermodynamic depth, though com-
mentary at that time by Landauer ~@19#, p. 307! raised related
concerns.
Assuming one wants to use thermodynamic depth to mea-
sure complexity, Occam’s razor @20# advises us to pick the
simplest representation we can—in this case, whichever se-
lection of states gives the smallest depth; cf. Ref. @8#, p. 193.
But this can always be trivially achieved by lumping every-
thing into one state, as just noted, which gives a vanishing
depth. More confusingly there are even cases, as we’ll see a
bit later, where such lumping is entirely appropriate.
Nor can the problem of state choice be reduced to that of
coarse graining the space of observables; as done in Ref. @8#,
pp. 194 and 195 and elsewhere, for example in Refs. @21#
and @22#. While this space can be readily represented by a
finite alphabet, as done above—indeed, digital measuring de-
vices so represent it without even asking permission—the
problem is that the connection between what we measure and
the underlying process is often obscure to the point of total
darkness. ~The definitions of ‘‘measurement’’ for Hamil-
tonian and quantum mechanical systems in Ref. @8# shed no
light on this point.! It is certainly not desirable to conflate a
process’s complexity with the complexity of whatever appa-
ratus connects the process to the variables we happen to have
seized upon as handles.
One helpful step in developing any measure of complex-
ity is that it be calculated on simple illustrative examples that
can be thoroughly and unambiguously analyzed. We now
proceed to do this for a series of examples—all of them
based on Markov chains, if only to guarantee that nothing
especially tricky or esoteric is at issue. In fact, we can inter-
pret each example as a type of one-dimensional spin-1 sta-
tistical mechanical system; cf. Ref. @23#. ~We emphasize that
our results in other sections are not restricted to this class of
Markov processes.!
The hidden Markov models we analyze contain a set of
‘‘internal’’ states, belonging to a finite alphabet X, which are
not directly observable. At each time step, there is some
probability of moving from the current state to any other,
while ‘‘emitting’’ an observable symbol drawn from another
alphabet A. We denote the probability of going from internal
state i to internal state j while emitting the measurement
value s as Ti j
(s)
. These models thus generate a pair of linked
stochastic processes, one over the internal states and the
other over the observable values, and only the latter is di-
rectly detectable. Nonhidden Markov models are those
where these two processes are one and the same: where A
5X and Ti j(s)50 unless s5 j .
Consider first a nonhidden system of three states X5A5$A,B,C%, each of which can go to any other, including
itself, with equal probability; see Fig. 1. Here, according to
the prescription of Lloyd and Pagels, DL5Llog23, the total
depth is infinite, and the dive is exactly equal to the entropy
rate of the observable sequences, i.e., v5hm
A5log23 bits per
step. The sequences generated are completely random, but
neither the depth nor dive vanish.
Next, we hide the internal states X from observation, but
at each time step a measuring instrument emits one of two
observable symbols sPA5$0,1%, as in Fig. 2. In this way
we recover a simple version of the micromacroscopic dis-
tinction of Ref. @8#. The transition matrices Ti j
(s) are, in this
case,
T ~0 !5F 1/2 0 00 1/2 00 0 1/2G ~23!
and
T ~1 !5F 0 1/2 00 0 1/21/2 0 0 G . ~24!
That is, each state either loops back on itself, emitting s
50, or goes to the next state in the chain, emitting s51, with
equal probability. The dive, i.e., the entropy rate hm
A of the
observables, is v51 bit per step. The entropy rate hm
X of the
FIG. 1. A simple Markov chain that generates random
sequences—BBAC—with finite dive (v5log23) and so infinite
total depth (DL!L!``).
FIG. 2. A simple hidden Markov model that generates strings
with finite dive (v5hmA51 bit per step! and infinite long-run depth.
The edge notation sup denotes that a transition is to be taken with
probability p, emitting measurement value s.
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state, there are two possible, equiprobable successors. More-
over, while the system is a quite adequate source of random
sequences, macroscopic states sPA, as well as the three
hidden states, continue to deepen at the rate of 1 bit per step.
Note that by inserting additional states between A and B,
which are equally likely to either loop back to themselves on
s50 or go to the next state in the chain on s51, it is easy to
go from Fig. 2 to ‘‘Rube Goldberg’’ automata. These are
representations with elaborated sets of states with exactly the
same observable process and properties ~i.e., with the same
Pr( . . . ,s21 ,s0 ,s1 , . . . ), where stP$0,1%), but with in-
creasing internal-state structure. Thus, there are inherent am-
biguities in using inappropriately baroque sets of states when
describing the structural properties of a process; ambiguities
that must be addressed somehow.
Finally, consider the symbolic dynamics of the logistic
map of the unit interval: xt115 f (xt)54xt(12xt). Here the
microscopic state space is continuous: xtPX5@0,1# , but we
observe xt with a binary-valued instrument A5$‘‘a’’
;@0,xˆ ),‘‘b’’;@xˆ ,1#%, where xˆ is the largest preimage of
1/2. When xtP@0,xˆ ) the instrument emits s5a and when
xtP@xˆ ,1# it emits s5b . This ‘‘nongenerating’’ partition of X
leads to the three hidden states that are coarse grainings of
X : A;@0,12xˆ ), B;@12xˆ ,xˆ ), and C;@xˆ ,1# . Recalling
that we can calculate the invariant distribution Pr(x), the
resulting stochastic finite-state model of the symbolic dy-
namics process is shown in Fig. 3. ~See Refs. @17# and @24#
for more discussion of this example.!
The transition matrices for this process are
T ~b !5F 0 0 00 0 1/20 0 0 G ~25!
and
T ~a !5F 1/2 1/2 00 1/2 01/2 1/2 0G . ~26!
The entropy rate hm
X
, measured over the states, is 1 bit per
step, but the dive v5hm
A ~of the observables! is lower: v
'0.811 bits per step. The states, in other words, are actually
worse—less predictable, deeper, and more demanding of
memory ~in a sense made precise presently!—than the sur-
face phenomena ~sequences over A) they are supposed to
FIG. 3. A hidden Markov model of the logistic map symbolic
dynamics observed with a nongenerating partition.explain. ~Refs. @17# and @25# discuss this curious phenom-
enon. A detailed mathematical analysis is found in Ref.
@24#.!
This example illustrates the measurement dependency of
both randomness and complexity. In contrast with the binary
instrument just used, if the logistic map is observed with a
generating partition, for which infinite a-b sequences are in
correspondence with the microscopic states xtP@0,1# , there
is only a single internal state. In this case, the internal state
entropy rate hm
X is zero and the entropy rate of the observed
symbol sequences is hm
A51 bit per symbol. It turns out that
this is the correct description of the logistic map dynamics;
see Ref. @26# for an elementary exposition.
Readers will have already noticed, and been troubled by,
the fact that all our examples are simple sources of random
strings, but have steep dives. According to the definition,
they are deep, complex processes, despite the explicit state-
ment of Lloyd and Pagels that depth is small or vanishes for
random processes.
VI. CAUSAL STATES AND e-MACHINES
On the one hand, what these examples make clear is that
we generally will not find macroscopic states appropriate to
measuring a process’s statistical complexity just by translat-
ing observables ~via coarse graining! into a finite alphabet.
On the other hand, especially in experimental work, we often
have no source of information other than the sequence of
finite-precision discrete-valued observables. There is a fun-
damental difficulty here. Moreover, part of the attraction of
thermodynamic depth, compared to ~say! Kolmogorov-
Chaitin complexity @9,10# and logical depth @27#, was its
claimed calculability from empirical data.
There is at least one release from these ambiguities: it is
found in the use of causal states, as they are conceived of by
computational mechanics—an extension of statistical me-
chanics that explicitly accounts for a process’s structure
@16,23#. From the viewpoint of an observer, the idea is that
two trajectories leave one in the same causal state if they
leave one equally knowledgeable as to the future. More for-
mally, a causal state S is an equivalence class over histories
sQ of observed states, such that all the sequences in the causal
state give the same conditional distribution for the semi-
infinite future sW:
e~sQ !5$sQ8u;sW Pr~sWusQ8!5Pr~sWusQ !%. ~27!
The causal-state equivalence classes form a partition of the
set Sª of all histories; see Fig. 4. Thus defined, e(sQ) is a
function from a history sQ to a set of histories, which are the
causal states Si , i50,1,2,3, . . . . We denote the set $Si% of
all causal states by S. It is convenient sometimes to have a
function taking one from a history sQ to the label i of its
equivalence class and, in a slight abuse of notation, we will
also call this e(sQ).
Since we need some choice of state if we are to apply
depth at all, and if we are not to consign it to the growing
collection of subjective complexity measures ~see Ref. @4#!,
we might as well select a process’s causal states. What is
280 PRE 59JAMES P. CRUTCHFIELD AND COSMA ROHILLA SHALIZInotable, though, is that, while causal states were not de-
signed with this end in mind, they minimize dive.
The representation of a process consisting of the causal
states and their transitions is known as an e-machine. In the
simplest setting, an e-machine is a Markov chain over a finite
number of causal states and so can be compactly described
by a labeled transition matrix Ti j
(s)
, notationally similar to
that for the examples above. This matrix can be calculated
~analytically or empirically! from the distribution of ob-
served sequences, a procedure called e-machine reconstruc-
tion.
An e-machine lets us calculate the probability of different
sequences of observables. It also leads to an invariant prob-
ability distribution Pr(S) over the causal states. The resulting
complexity measure for a process is the statistical complexity
Cm that is defined simply as the Shannon entropy of that
distribution @16#: Cm5H@S# . Cm measures the average
amount of historical information stored in the current state.
Our results in Sec. VII are not, however, restricted to cases
where the e-machine is finite Markovian, merely to ones
where there is a probability measure over the causal states.
A process’s thermodynamic depth, and thus its dive, are
defined with reference to its macroscopic states, whatever we
take those to be. Due to the ambiguities that follow from a
prosaic interpretation of depth’s definition we propose to re-
define depth, and by implication the dive, solely in terms of
a process’s causal states. The first result of taking the ‘‘mac-
roscopic’’ states to be the causal states is that the dive is the
entropy rate of the e-machine’s internal-state process: v
[hm
X
, where X5S. The second result is that by Eq. ~18! v
<Cm . In fact, v,Cm , if there is any mutual information in
the observed sequences SJ, by Eq. ~106! in Ref. @23#.
FIG. 5. The e-machine for the unhidden Markov model of Fig.
1. The internal entropy rate hm
X and the statistical complexity Cm
vanish since there is a single causal state.
FIG. 4. A schematic representation of partitioning the set Sª of
all histories into causal states Si . Within each causal state all the
individual histories sQ have the same conditional distribution Pr(SW usQ)
for future observables. Note that the Si need not form compact sets;
we have simply drawn them that way here for clarity.Causal-state equivalence-classing guarantees that the
e-machine is as small as it can be and still be an accurate
predictor of future observed sequences; see Sec. VII B be-
low. This makes e-machines for both highly ordered and
highly random sequences very simple: a high degree of ran-
domness means that many distinct sequences of observables
leave one equally uncertain about the future and, conse-
quently, those sequences all leave the system in the same
causal state. In this way one derives the desired ‘‘boundary
conditions’’ for statistical complexity measures—low both
for ordered and for random processes—from the underlying
principle of optimal prediction; that is, from Eq. ~27!.
These properties of causal states suffice to rescue the
complexity analysis of the examples from the confusions of
the last section. The first ~Fig. 1! corresponds to an
e-machine with a single causal state S0 that returns to itself
on three separate, equally probable symbols A5$A,B,C%
~see Fig. 5!. The entropy rate hmA of the observed sequences
is ~as always! preserved under the change of representation
to causal states, but the entropy rate hm
S of the causal state
process itself, i.e., the now-redefined dive v , is, like the sta-
tistical complexity, zero.
A similar fate awaits our second example ~Fig. 2!. Under
causal-state equivalence-classing, the three alleged states
collapse into one, yielding an ideal coin-tossing machine
with a single state and two transitions ~see Fig. 6!. Here
again the statistical complexity and the new dive vanish. De-
fining depth in terms of a process’s causal states leads us, in
both examples, to recover the intuitively correct notion that
these sources of purely random sequences are neither struc-
turally complex nor store much information about their his-
tory.
In our final example ~Fig. 3!, the future conditional distri-
bution of observables depends only on how long it has been
since the last b, leading to a countable infinity of causal
states ~see Fig. 7!. It turns out that the new dive and the
statistical complexity can be analytically calculated; one
finds v'0.677 867 bits per measurement and Cm'2.711 47
FIG. 6. The e-machine for the hidden Markov model of Fig. 2.
The internal entropy rate hm
X and the statistical complexity Cm again
vanish since there is a single causal state.
FIG. 7. The e-machine for the hidden Markov model of Fig. 3
has a countable infinity of causal states. The internal entropy rate
hm
X and statistical complexity Cm are both positive, indicating that
this is an intrinsically more complex process than the other two
examples.
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is a more complex process than the other two examples.
One of the desired properties of thermodynamic depth
was that it accounted for the history of the ‘‘assembly pro-
cess’’ ~@8#, pp. 187–189 and passim!. We should emphasize
that by definition causal states account for a form of histori-
cal memory, though in an importantly different way. Causal
states measure the amount of historical information stored in
a system.
VII. OPTIMAL SHALLOWNESS OF e-MACHINES
Working with the e-machine representation forces one to
distinguish between ~1! sequences over coarse-grained ob-
servables A, ~2! sequences over causal states S, and ~3!
sequences over transitions, the labeled edges $(i , j ,s):Ti j(s)
.0%. There is a many-to-one relation between edge se-
quences and causal-state sequences and also between edge
sequences and observable sequences. But, as we saw when
we defined the causal states as equivalence classes, Eq. ~27!,
there is a function that takes a history to a causal state:
namely, e:Sª°S. One consequence is that one can specify
all of the relevant historical information by noting which of
the causal states the process is in, rather than recounting a
possibly infinite amount of information from the history SQ
that led to the current state. That is, causal states provide a
compression of a process’s history.
These distinctions and the historical compression are
good motivations for deciding which type of state to use for
a process. But these alone are not enough, so let us consider
alternatives to causal states, namely, another setR of states,
call them R-states, that are determinable from observed se-
quences and that, like causal states, partition Sª ; see Fig. 8.
We assume that these rivals to the e-machine are, like the
e-machine itself, restricted to using only the past history of
observables in their predictions, without any other hints.
As one ranges over alternative choices of state—
swimming around in Occam’s pool of possible
partitions—we will show that the e-machine has a threefold
optimality: ~i! no set of R-states is more informative about
future observables than the causal states; of those choices of
states that are as predictive as the causal states, none has ~ii!
a smaller statistical complexity nor ~iii! a smaller entropy
rate over the internal states. We conclude that none of the
alternatives, if used to calculate the depth, would give us a
FIG. 8. An alternative set $Ri% of states that partition Sª overlaid
on the causal states. ~The Ri are delineated by dashed lines.! The
collection of all such alternative partitions form Occam’s ‘‘pool.’’
Note again that the Ri need not be compact.shallower dive than the causal states. We will prove these in
order.
A. Nothing forecasts better than an e-machine
Call the sequence of observables up to the present time SQ ,
the random variable that is the next observable S, and the
random variable that is the whole sequence of future observ-
ables SW . Recall that the function e:Sª°S returns the causal
state the e-machine is in after observing SQ and define the
function h:Sª°R similarly for the R-states. We measure
the forecasting ability of a set of states by H@SW uR# @28#, the
uncertainty that remains in the future observables once we
know the current state. That is, the better the set of states is
at forecasting—the more prescient it is—the smaller this un-
certainty. From Eq. ~27! it follows that
PrSW ue~SQ !5Pr~SW uSQ !, ~28!
and so
H@SW ue~SQ !#5H@SW uSQ # . ~29!
Since, for any random variables X and Y and function f,
H@Y u f ~X !#>H@Y uX# , ~30!
it follows that
H@SW uh~SQ !#>H@SW uSQ # ~31!
5H@SW ue~SQ !# ~32!
and so
H@SW uR#>H@SW uS# . ~33!
Thus, no alternative set R of states sees the future better
than the causal states.
In what follows, we will put a hat over the name of any
rival set of states that is as predictive as the causal states, i.e.,
we refer to states inRˆ if and only if H@SW uRˆ #5H@SW uS# .
B. Nothing as prescient as an e-machine is simpler
Suppose we have a set Rˆ of states for which H@SW uRˆ #
5H@SW uS# . Then, because the causal states are equivalence
classes with respect to future conditional probabilities, the
Rˆ -states must be refinements of these classes. That is, rather
than the situation depicted in Fig. 8, we have the
Rˆ -partitioning shown in Fig. 9. Otherwise at least one Rˆ i ,
considered as a set, would have to include histories that be-
longed to at least two distinct causal states. Such mixing of
causal states can only increase the uncertainty about the fu-
ture sequence SW of observables. That is, for every Rˆ i there is
a Sj such that Rˆ i#Sj and so every causal state is a union of
Rˆ -states.
The result is that the causal state is a function of the
Rˆ -state: S5g(Rˆ ). Thus,
282 PRE 59JAMES P. CRUTCHFIELD AND COSMA ROHILLA SHALIZIH@S#5H@g~Rˆ !#<H@Rˆ # . ~34!
But H@S# is Cm , the statistical complexity of the e-machine,
whereas H@Rˆ # is the statistical complexity of the
h-machine—the set ofRˆ states and their transitions. Thus, of
the optimally predictive alternative representations the
e-machine is the smallest, as measured by Cm .
An argument exactly parallel to the one in the preceding
subsection shows, when applied to the equally prescient al-
ternatives, that
H@SW uRˆ #5H@SW uS# ⇒ H@SW LuRˆ #5H@SW LuS# , ~35!
for L51,2, . . . ~the opposite implication is not true, how-
ever!. Thus, the causal states are also at least as informative
about the next ~single! observable S as any rival and, for that
matter, about any finite subsequence SW L of the future. How-
ever, in the general case of the previous paragraphs it is
necessary to consider the whole semi-infinite future because,
potentially, coarser partitions can match these finite-L pre-
dictive powers. If, for instance, two histories have the same
distribution for S, but different distributions over the whole
future, they belong to different causal states. An Rˆ -state that
combined those two causal states, however, would enjoy the
same ability to predict S and its h-machine would have a
smaller statistical complexity.
C. Nothing as prescient as an e-machine has a smaller dive
We will now show that the e-machine’s dive (v5hmS) is
at least as small as that of any equally prescient alternative.
This also turns on the fact that such Rˆ -states are refinements
of the causal states. The e-machine is deterministic in the
sense of automata theory @23#; that is, the present state S and
the next observable S together fix the next state S 8, and so
H@S 8uS ,S#50. Thus, we have
H@SuS#5H@S 8,SuS# . ~36!
The Rˆ -machine, however, is not necessarily deterministic in
this sense, but all entropies are non-negative, so
H@Rˆ 8uS ,Rˆ #>0. Since we are considering alternatives with
FIG. 9. Any alternative partition that is as prescient as the causal
states must be a refinement of the causal-state partition. That is,
each Rˆ i must be a ~possibly improper! subset of some Sj . Other-
wise, at least one Rˆ i would have to contain parts of at least two
causal states. And so using this Rˆ i to predict the future observables
leads to more uncertainty about SW than using the causal states.the same predictive power as the e-machine, i.e., alternatives
for which H@SW uS#5H@SW uRˆ # , then we have H@SuS#
5H@SuRˆ # . On the one hand,
H@Rˆ 8,SuRˆ #5H@SuRˆ #1H@Rˆ 8uS ,Rˆ # ~37!
>H@SuRˆ # ~38!
5H@SuS# ~39!
5H@S 8,SuS# ~40!
5H@S 8uS#1H@SuS 8,S# . ~41!
On the other hand,
H@Rˆ 8,SuRˆ #5H@Rˆ 8uRˆ #1H@SuRˆ 8,Rˆ # , ~42!
as well, so
H@Rˆ 8uRˆ #1H@SuRˆ 8,Rˆ #>H@S 8uS#1H@SuS 8,S# , ~43!
or
H@Rˆ 8uRˆ #2H@S 8uS#>H@SuS 8,S#2H@SuRˆ 8,Rˆ # . ~44!
Since a causal state is a function of an Rˆ -state, the transition
pair (S 8,S) is a function of the transition pair (Rˆ 8,Rˆ ), im-
plying that H@SuS 8,S#>H@SuRˆ 8,Rˆ # . Thus, the right-hand
side of Eq. ~44! is non-negative and this implies that
H@Rˆ 8uRˆ #>H@S 8uS# , ~45!
which is the desired result; namely, vRˆ >vS. That is, nothing
that predicts as well as the e-machine has a smaller dive than
the e-machine does.
VIII. CONCLUSION
If one prefers processes over static descriptions and dis-
likes pretending every natural thing is a digital computer,
thermodynamic depth seemed to be an attractive complexity
measure: ‘‘one of the remarkably few thrusts in this area that
is not conspicuously vacuous,’’ in the words of Landauer
@19#. Since total depth most likely shares the incalculability,
though not the formal uncomputability, of Kolmogorov-
Chaitin complexity and logical depth, it is not, at face value,
physically significant. Dive, the rate at which depth in-
creases, is both calculable and significant. We showed that
dive is the reverse-time Shannon entropy rate of the stochas-
tic process over the macroscopic states one takes the system
to be in. With nothing else said or added, however, depth
typically measures historical randomness; as do
Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity and the Shannon entropy
rate.
Unfortunately, Ref. @8#, which introduced depth, gave no
clue as to how macroscopic states are to be selected; though
it strongly suggested this is simply a matter of coarse-
graining the space of microscopic states; cf. @8#, pp. 194-195.
As we have shown, this approach produces manifestly am-
biguous results.
PRE 59 283THERMODYNAMIC DEPTH OF CAUSAL STATESBy way of fixing depth, we highlighted the key role of the
choice of macroscopic states. The causal states of computa-
tional mechanics do not suffer from the defects and ill-
definedness that led to trouble with other sorts of states. The
procedure that identifies them, e-machine reconstruction,
also gives us a way to calculate depth and dive. We removed
depth’s ambiguities and recovered its claimed features by
redefining it in terms of the causal states.
We then gave our main results, showing that no alterna-
tive set of states to the causal states contains more informa-
tion about the future of observables. Moreover, unless an
alternative throws some of that information away it cannothave a smaller statistical complexity or a lower dive. Thus,
e-machines are optimally shallow.
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